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Criminal Procedure. State v. DeMagistris, 714 A.2d 567 (R.I.
1998). A trial justice's disbelief of a defendant's testimony as to
profit motive under the statute proscribing prostitution is insuffi-
cient to sustain a conviction where there exists no other evidence of
guilt. Statute proscribing loitering for indecent purposes is in-
tended to apply to the public solicitation of prostitution. A defend-
ant, on a request for a Franks hearing resulting from an omission
in the warrant application, must first show that the omission was
made knowingly or recklessly, and second, that the omission was
material.
In State v. DeMagistris,l the Rhode Island Supreme Court ex-
amined the application of Rhode Island General Laws sections 11-
34-5 and 11-34-8 to the defendant's attempt to beguile prospective
models to pose nude and perform sexual acts on him, while filming
the scene in a seemingly professional style, and to his statement
that he was a professional photographer who intended to market
the photographs abroad. 2 Reversing the conviction for harboring
prostitution under section 11-34-5, the court held that the evidence
was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the requi-
site profit motive to convict defendant of securing an indecent act
for pecuniary gain.3 In construing Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 11-34-8, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prohi-
bition of loitering for indecent purposes is aimed at public
solicitation of prostitution, and does not extend to the telephone
solicitation of potential actors for pornographic movies. 4
Rhode Island has recognized that the Franks doctrine may ex-
tend to material omissions in addition to affirmative falsehood. 5
However, the court in DeMagistris, held that the police affiant's
failure to mention the defendant's statement that he had no drugs,
while presumably reckless, was not material, and therefore, the
warrant to search his apartment was supported by probable
cause.
6
1. 714 A.2d 567 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 568-70.
3. See id. at 572.
4. See id. at 574.
5. See id. at 575 (citing State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1998)).
6. See id. at 576.
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FACTS AND TRAVEL
Between the summer of 1992 and June of 1993, the defendant,
moonlighting as "Josh," solicited prospective nude models over the
telephone. 7 His phone calls began gingerly; he merely inquired
whether the phone recipient was interested in earning some extra
money for "modeling."8 Once Josh successfully peaked the wo-
man's interest, he became more lascivious, and eventually revealed
that she would be expected to pose nude, assume erotic positions,
and perform various sexual acts, including fellatio and intercourse
with the photo/videographer. 9 Josh assured his prospective models
that any photographs or films that he took would be distributed
outside of New England. 10
The defendant located his targets by searching confidential
school records while in his professional capacity as director of spe-
cial education at the Pawtucket School Department." He was es-
pecially fond of single mothers or younger female students because
of what he perceived to be their restrained financial situation,
making them potentially receptive candidates. 12
After several failed attempts, Josh's luck turned the other
way; he located an ambitious actress-a working prostitute-who
willingly performed fellatio upon him while he filmed the event, all
for the bargain price of forty dollars for each "love" scene.13 Sadly
enough for Josh, his exploits ended with his phone call to Susan
Gity (Gity), a thirty-two-year-old mother of two boys in the Paw-
tucket special education program, who accepted Josh's invitation
to model bathing suits or lingerie. 14 Once at Gity's house, Josh
explained that the modeling would require nude poses, and per-
forming various sex acts on film.' 5 Josh offered Gity and her fe-
male friend some marijuana to help them relax. 16
Once enlightened about the parameters of the modeling job,
Gity and her friend feigned interest, but stated they "wanted to
7. See id. at 569.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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think it over."' 7 Once the defendant left Gity's house, she phoned
the Pawtucket police, and together they set up a sting operation. 18
When defendant arrived at Gity's request the next day, she asked
Josh if he had any drugs, to which he replied, "he did not."19 After
asking Gity to undress, he went to his car to retrieve his camera
bag, and upon returning, the police arrested him.20
The police applied for a warrant to search the defendant's
home, car, camera case and office at the Pawtucket school depart-
ment for evidence of his business venture and also for any drugs.21
The warrant affidavit only described Gity's recount of Josh's pitch
where he offered to supply Gity and her friend with some mari-
juana to help them relax; however, the affiant did not inform the
magistrate of Josh's negative response to Gity's request for some
drugs during their second encounter.22 The warrant was issued,
and upon searching defendant's residence, the police found a small
quantity of marijuana in a closed jewelry box, along with several
video tapes including the one with the fellatio incident.23 Docu-
ments with phone numbers of various women were also found.24
The defendant was charged by information with forty-one
criminal counts.25 Following a trial without a jury, the defendant
was found guilty on all counts pertaining to the securing of an in-
decent act for pecuniary gain, enticement of prostitution or other
indecent act, and obscene or harassing telephone calls in violation
of Rhode Island General Laws sections 11-34-5, 11-34-8 and 11-35-
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 570.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. This omission formed the basis of the defendant's appeal on the
alleged Franks violation issue. The defendant disputes that probable cause ex-
isted for the magistrate to authorize the seizure of "[a] certain quantity of con-
trolled or illegal substances." Id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. Included in this myriad of charges were several counts of solicits-
tion of the crime against nature in violation section 11-1-9 of the Rhode Island
General Laws, and one count of a completed infraction of the crime against nature
proscribed in section 11-10-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws; however the
Rhode Island Superior Court dismissed these counts on equal protection grounds.
See id.
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17 respectively.28 The defendant was also charged with one count
of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Rhode Island
General Laws section 21-28-4.01(C)(1)(b); he was convicted on this
count, and appealed based upon the lack of probable cause to issue
the warrant, which led to the seizure of marijuana from his
residence. 27
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has been "especially loathe
to question the [trial] justice's evaluation of the evidence, espe-
cially on a critical issue of mental intent."28 A criminal conviction,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, will be set aside only
where the judgment is "clearly erroneous."29 According to the
court, a "finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' when the totality of
the evidence leaves the reviewing court with 'a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has occurred. '"'30 Additionally, it is not
the task of the reviewing court to weigh testimony or to assess the
credibility of witnesses; that determination is reserved for the trial
court.31
With respect to the statutory construction of section 11-34-8,
pertaining to loitering for indecent purposes, the intent of the stat-
ute is to prohibit prostitutes from "hawking their wares in public-
whether this is done by strutting up and down a public street or by
calling out to passersby .... " 32 This section was carved out of the
former version of 11-34-5 in response to a rash of streetwalking in
the West End of Providence.33 In the COYOTE case, the court ad-
dressed the prostitution problem in Providence, specifically the
problem of male customers, or "johns," harassing people on the
26. See id. The defendant conceded on appeal his conviction under section 11-
35-17 of the Rhode Island General Laws; accordingly the court affirmed the convic-
tion. The convictions under the other two statutes remained the subject of the
appeal. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 571 (citing In re Derek, 448 A.2d 765, 767 (R.I. 1982); State v.
Chatell, 401 A.2d 436, 437-38 (R.I. 1979)).
29. Id. (citing In re Derek, 448 A.2d at 767).
30. In re Derek, 448 A.2d at 767 (citing State v. Riendeau, 448 A.2d 735, 737
(R.I. 1982)).
31. See Chatell, 401 A.2d at 437.
32. DeMagistris, 714 A.2d at 573.
33. See id. (citing COYOTE v. Roberts, 523 F. Supp. 352, 354-55 (D.R.I.
1981)).
1999]
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street while trying to pick up girls.3 4 The situation in the West
End neighborhood sparked the amendment of section 11-34-5 to
include the phrase "for pecuniary gain."3 5
With respect to the Franks violation, the United States
Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware36 that a police officer's
intentional or reckless inclusion of false material facts in a war-
rant application, would render any evidence seized pursuant to
this warrant suppressed. 37 The federal Franks doctrine mandates
a two-part test: first, the defendant must show that the affiant in-
tended to deceive the magistrate issuing the warrant, and second,
the defendant must show a material falsehood, in that probable
cause to issue the warrant would not have existed if the affiant had
properly informed the magistrate.38 While Rhode Island has im-
pliedly recognized that the Franks doctrine may extend to material
omissions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to address the
implications of the doctrine in depth, or define the outer contours
of constitutional protections surrounding the warrant clauses of
either the Federal or Rhode Island constitutions.39 In State v. Wil-
shire,40 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the affiant's
omission of a witness' tentative statement as to the whereabouts of
a defendant, which could potentially negate his/her guilt, did not
automatically trigger a Franks violation. 41 In support of its hold-
ing, the court reasoned that it is not the police officer's function in
preparing an affidavit for a search warrant to assume the role of a
defense attorney or to include facts that might diminish the estab-
lishment of probable cause. 42
34. See COYOTE, 523 F. Supp at 354.
35. Id. at 355 (quoting the testimony of Richard Kelaghan, legal counsel to the
House Judiciary Committee). The COYOTE court suggested that the amendment
was in part prompted by the decision to treat "johns" as prostitutes, and charged
with a petty misdemeanor, rather than "pimps," and charged with a felony. Hence
the new version of section 11-34-5 was directed towards "pimps" and not "johns."
See id.
36. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
37. See DeMagistris, 714 A.2d at 574 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).
38. See id. at 575.
39. See id. at 575 n.3 (citing State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444, 450-51 (R.I.
1986)).
40. 509 A.2d 444 (R.L 1986).
41. Id. at 450-51.
42. See id. at 451.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Section 11-34-5
Justice Flanders, in writing the opinion for the court, first
stated that the primary objective of the clause in section 11-34-5,
pertaining to the securing of an indecent act for pecuniary gain, is
to prohibit "pandering."43 Read in conjunction with section 11-34-
1, which prohibits recruiting prostitutes, section 11-34-5 seems to
target the pimp who secures the "john" for the prostitute and prof-
its from a share of the john's fee.44 Justice Flanders rejected the
state's contention that the statute should extend to persons, such
as the defendant, who secured actors for blue movies, and intended
to profit by subsequently selling the films or photographs of the
indecent acts, because there was insufficient evidence to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to profit from
the sale of the tapes or photographs from the modeling shoot.45
The court reasoned that after an exhaustive search, the only
evidence of a profit motive that the police were able to come up
with was flimsy at best.46 All they had was Josh's statement that
he was a professional photographer; that Josh used his marketing
pitch on the prostitute who performed fellatio on him; that Josh
filmed the fellatio scene in a seemingly professional style;47 that
the nude photographs of other women could not be found; and that
43. DeMagistris, 714 A.2d at 571. The court defines "pandering" as "'[olne
who caters to the lust of others; a male bawd, a pimp, or procurer.'" Id. at n.1
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (6th ed. 1990)).
44. See id. at 571. Section 11-34-1 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to secure a person for a house of ill fame, or to procure for a person a place as
inmate of a house of ill fame ... or come into this state or leave this state for the
purpose of prostitution. It shall be unlawful for any person by any means to keep,
hold, or detain.., any person in any place for the purpose of prostitution.... " R.I.
Gen. Laws § 11-34-1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment), quoted in DeMagistris, 714 A.2d
at 571 n.2. Likewise, section 11-34-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any per-
son, for pecuniary gain, to secure, direct, or transport another for the purpose of
prostitution...." R.I. Gen. Laws. § 11-34-5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment), quoted in
DeMagistris, 714 A.2d at 571 (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 571. By reversing the conviction on sufficiency grounds, the
court did not elaborate on whether the element of "pecuniary gain" may still be
satisfied where a defendant-who initially pays for the indecent act-profits from
the subsequent sale of the tapes, films or photographs.
46. See id. at 572.
47. As Justice Flanders noted, this essence of professionalism was limited to
the defendant's ability to "hold the camera steady during his multiple sexual
climaxes." Id.
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the defendant's testimony that he did not intend to profit from any
resale of the tapes or photos lacked credibility.48 The totality of
the evidence failed to connect the defendant to any commercial
venture, and lacked any suggestion of real marketing activity.49
Rather, the evidence was more indicative of a "flimsy ruse that [the
defendant] used to justify his telephonic solicitations for sex."50
The mere evidence that the defendant had preserved the videotape
of the prostitute performing fellatio proved to the court little more
than the defendant's desire to use the film for his own later view-
ing pleasure since there were no evidence of any copies, editing or
prints.51 Likewise, the court found inconclusive evidence of Josh's
steady camera hand since this, too, could have enhanced his per-
sonal viewing pleasure. 52
With respect to the credibility of the defendant's testimony,
the court noted that in State v. Mattata153 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court recognized that a defendant, who elects to testify,
risks being disbelieved, and a trier of fact may conclude that the
opposite of the defendant's testimony is true.54 Disbelief of testi-
mony is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt where there is other
evidence of the defendant's guilt.55
The court distinguished Mattatall on the basis that there ex-
isted no other competent evidence of the defendant's profit motive;
rather, the evidence suggested that he was acting out a misguided
fantasy.
Section 11-34-8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defendant's
telephone solicitations were not the kind of passersby solicitation
for prostitution or other indecent acts that the statute was in-
tended to prohibit, but rather, such acts were prohibited by the
statute dealing with obscene or harassing telephone calls.56 The
court rejected the state's technical reading of the language con-
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1992).
54. See DeMagistris, 714 A.2d at 572.
55. See id. (citing Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1109).
56. See id. at 573. Section 11-34-8 provides:
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tained in the last portion of the statute to criminalize any "pa-
tronage, inducement, or securing of indecent acts" regardless of
where those acts occur.5 7 The court further rejected the state's
contention that "any such act" refers to not only loitering, but also
the act of prostitution or any indecent act.58
The court reasoned that this interpretation would take the lat-
ter portion of the statute out of context from the rest of the preced-
ing statutory language.59 In support of this reasoning the court
observed one of the fundamental canons of statutory construction;
that is, no construction should be adopted that would "demote any
significant phrase or clause to mere surplusage."60 Hence, the
court applied the statutory-construction principle of "noscitur a
sociis," whereby one phrase in the statute draws its scope from its
association with the other portions of the statute.6 1
Franks Violation
The court applied the First Circuit's analysis in United States
v. Rumney 6 2 to determine that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it denied the defendant a Franks hearing.63 In
Rumney, the First Circuit applied the federal Franks test to a situ-
It shall be unlawful for any person to stand or wander in or near any
public highway or street, or any public or private place, and attempt to
engage passersby in conversation, ... for the purpose of prostitution or
other indecent act, or to patronize or induce or otherwise secure a person
to commit any such act.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-34-8 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. (citing State v. Ricci, 533 A.2d 844,848 (R.I. 1987); State v. Caprio, 477
A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1984)).
61. Id. Here, the court noted that the phrase, "to patronize or induce or other-
wise secure a person to commit any such act," Section 11-34-8 of the Rhode Island
General Laws draws its scope from the preceding language referring to prostitu-
tion as well as its title, "Loitering for indecent purposes." R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-34-8
(1956) (1994 Reenactment).
62. 867 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 908 (1989). The court
did not engage in an independent assessment of whether the federal Franks doc-
trine was applicable to omissions of critical facts from a warrant application, as
distinguished from mistruths, or whether the Warrant Clause in Article 1, section
6 of the Rhode Island Constitution would offer greater protections. See DeMagis-
tris, 714 A.2d at 575 n.4. Rather, the court evaluated the First Circuit approach to
Franks violations under the federal standard to determine whether a Franks hear-
ing should have been granted in the case at hand. See id. at 575-76.
63. See id. at 575-76.
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ation involving a police officer's omission from a warrant applica-
tion of a witness' denial of any connection with the defendant, but
who offered another version of events following his arrest as an
accomplice. 64 While presumably reckless, the omission was imma-
terial because the inclusion of the witness' denials prior to his
arrest would not have undercut his credibility so as to dispel any
basis for probable cause.65
Based on the Rumney analysis, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the police affiant's failure to include the no-drug
exchange between Gity and Josh during the sting operation, while
presumably reckless, was not material, and therefore the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing a Franks hearing.66
The court reasoned that Josh's admissions as to his association
with drugs represented conflicting statements to Gity at different
times, and that it was not the role of a magistrate, assessing a war-
rant application, to resolve credibility questions or to make any
firm conclusions beyond the threshold determination that there ex-
ists a "'fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.'" 67 Even if the omitted statement
had been included in the warrant application, probable cause still
would have existed .68
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's analysis in DeMagistris
provides helpful guidance as to the scope and application of two
prostitution statutes. However, the court did not reach the issue of
whether section 11-34-5, dealing with the harboring of prostitu-
tion, may apply to someone other than a panderer or "pimp," but
who subsequently profits from his indecent acts. The court's deci-
sion does make clear that in order to sustain a conviction under
this statute, the totality of the evidence must link the defendant to
64. See id. at 575 (citing Rumney, 867 F.2d at 714).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 576.
67. Id. (quoting State v. King, 693 A.2d 658,661 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))).
68. See id. The defendant, posing as Josh, told Gity and her friend that he
could "provide marijuana for them to relax if they wanted to 'get high.'" Id. at 569.
The court also noted that one possible interpretation of Josh's later statement, "'I
don't have any [stuff]" could have meant that he didn't have any drugs available
at that particular time. Id. at 576 n.4.
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some real commercial activity. Likewise, the court's narrow inter-
pretation of section 11-34-8 limits the types of acts that may be
proscribed under the statute. In the area of search and seizure,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmatively made clear that the
Franks doctrine does extend to material omissions; however, the
court stopped short of any in depth analysis of its application to
omissions of critical facts from a warrant application, or of defining
the outer contours of the constitutional protections surrounding
the warrant clauses of the Federal and the Rhode Island
constitutions.
Jennifer L. Brooks
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Criminal Procedure. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I. 1998).
The dismissal of an indictment, due to the state's failure to comply
with discovery orders, is not warranted by prejudice to defendants
that resulted from defense attorneys allegedly being forced to dis-
close their trial strategy. A state court's supervisory power does
not grant the authority to dismiss a grand jury indictment unless
both "outrageous conduct and demonstrable and otherwise incur-
able prejudice" are found.
In State v. DiPrete,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court limited
the scope of courts' inherent supervisory powers and articulated a
conservative application of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The court acknowledged that case law gener-
ally allows the vacating of a conviction and the ordering of a new
trial as possible sanctions for violations of discovery orders.2 How-
ever, the court found that Rule 16 did not authorize a dismissal of
the indictment in DiPrete because the violation was not a denial of
discovery; a mere delay of discovery was not sufficiently prejudicial
for the trial judge to impose the harsh sanction of dismissal. 3
Although the superior court is vested with the inherent power to
impose sanctions pursuant to its judicial authority, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court noted that such authority is not without limi-
tation.4 Thus, it is inappropriate for a court to punish
prosecutorial misconduct by creating an unauthorized exclusion-
ary measure, particularly in the absence of extreme transgression
which causes severe prejudice. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Former Rhode Island Governor Edward D. DiPrete, and his
son, Dennis L. DiPrete, were indicted by a grand jury which
charged them with twenty-two counts relating to acts of bribery
and extortion.6 The state was sanctioned after the superior court
determined that it had attempted to subvert the discovery process
1. 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 1271-73.
3. Id. at 1272.
4. See id. at 1276.
5. See id.
6. See State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A&B, 1997 WL 839899 (R.I. Super.
March 11, 1997).
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with undue delay.7 After a lengthy hearing, the trial justice found
that state's counsel had not cooperated with discovery orders, vio-
lating Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Brady doctrine, and provisions of a stipulation between the
state and defendants.8 Accordingly, all counts of the indictment
were dismissed. 9
On appeal, the state contended that the doctrine articulated in
Brady v. Maryland'° did not provide precedent for such a severe
sanction, and therefore was erroneously applied by the trial court
judge.1 ' The state also proposed that Rule 16 did not warrant a
dismissal under the circumstances of the case, and that case law
supported a limited application of the rule.' 2 Furthermore, the
state argued that the superior court could not invoke its general
supervisory power to dismiss an indictment returned by a grand
jury for the purpose of sanctioning the prosecution.' 3
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
On appeal, the state presented three issues for consideration.
First, the state argued that the Brady principles were insufficient
to uphold the dismissal of the entire indictment. 14 Second, the
state contended that Rule 16 did not support the judgment. 15
Third, it was argued that the superior court, in the exercise of its
supervisory power, overreached in the application of its
authority. 16
Brady Principles
Prior to Brady, the United States Supreme Court found that
false testimony against an accused was a violation of due process,
7. See id. at *19.
8. See id.
9. See id. at *20. Counts 23 and 24 were severed counts and were not dis-
missed at this time. The counts were perjury charges not at issue in this appeal,
and were also eventually dismissed.
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process is violated when evidence
against the accused is withheld, notwithstanding the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution).
11. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1270 (R.I. 1998).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
6891999]
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and that the ordering of a new trial was an appropriate remedy in
such instances.17 In 1963, Brady extended the principle to include
the withholding of evidence that could result in the defendant's ac-
quittal. 18 If such testimony could create any "reasonable likeli-
hood that the judgment of the jury could be affected," then due
process was violated and a new trial must be ordered. 19
The Brady principles were not adopted by Rhode Island courts
until the case of In re Ouimette.20 There, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted a test in which the defendant "must show
there is a significant chance that the use and development of the
withheld evidence by skilled counsel at trial would have produced
a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a convic-
tion.21 This principle was furthered in State v. Wyche, 22 where the
court held a defendant was entitled to a new trial without estab-
lishing prejudice in cases where the prosecution intentionally with-
held evidence.
As applied to the case at bar, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that the Brady principles were irrelevant. 23 Brady is only
applicable in the event that an accused has been convicted after
exculpatory evidence was deliberately withheld and that evidence
could have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.24
Thus the doctrine is necessarily a post-trial remedy, and inapplica-
ble to the pretrial issues raised by the state on appeal.
Rule 16 - Discovery
In determining whether a Rule 16 violation would warrant a
reversal of a conviction and the granting of a new trial, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court turned to the existing state case law. A host
of cases were presented in which a new trial was granted due to
prosecutorial misconduct.25 The cases indicated that the vacating
17. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959).
18. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1270.
19. Id.
20. In re Ouimette, 342 A.2d 250 (R.I. 1975).
21. Id. at 254-55. This test was originally articulated in United States v.
Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 287 (2d Cir. 1973).
22. 518 A.2d 907 (R.I. 1986).
23. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1271.
24. See id.
25. See State v. Evans, 668 A.2d 1256, 1260 (R.I. 1996) (new trial ordered for
unintentional nondisclosure); State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, at 910-11 (R.I. 1986)
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of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial were appropriate
remedies for violations of discovery orders, regardless of whether
the violation was intentional.26 The court paused to distinguish
the case at bar from the above cases in noting that the defendants
were not denied discovery but that discovery was merely delayed. 27
In the cited cases, all defendants had gone through the entire trial
process and were convicted before a new trial was ordered due to
discovery violations. Defendants here had not yet gone to trial, but
the court allowed the granting of a new trial.28
The court next discussed State v. Quintal,2 9 where an indict-
ment was dismissed for failure to follow a superior court order.30
The trial justice place heavy reliance on Quintal in justifying his
dismissal, but the supreme court could not agree with his interpre-
tation because it felt the ruling in that case was limited to its par-
ticular facts.31 Quintal was unique because the state had signed
an agreement which compelled it to produce certain materials or
be subject to the condition of dismissal. The state was unable to
meet the condition, and accordingly the court implemented the fi-
nal judgment as stipulated to in the agreement. 32
The trial justice applied the four-part test enunciated in State
v. Coelho to determine sanctions.33 He found that sufficient preju-
dice existed in that the defense counsel was forced to disclose its
strategy in moving for dismissal. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, found this prejudice to be minimal and was insuf-
(new trial ordered for deliberate nondisclosure by prosecution); State v. Verlaque,
465 A.2d 207, 212-14 (R.I. 1983) (new trial ordered because of nondisclosure); State
v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241 (R.I. 1982) (new trial ordered because of trial justice's re-
fusal to grant a continuance in light of failure of state to complete furnishing of
discovery material until eleventh hour); State v. Darcy, 442 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I.
1982) (new trial was ordered for failure to disclose an incriminating statement
made by the accused).
26. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1272.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. 479 A.2d 117 (RI. 1984).
30. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1273.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. 454 A.2d 241 (R.I. 1982). The factors in State v. Coelho provide that "[a]
trial justice should consider '(1) the reason for nondisclosure, (2) the extent of prej-
udice to the opposing party, (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a con-
tinuance, and (4) any other relevant factors.'" DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1273 (quoting
Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245).
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ficient to warrant a dismissal.3 4 Rule 16(i) contains a "catchall"
provision which does not specifically include or exclude the power
of dismissal as a sanction, and defendants' counsel argued that dis-
missal is an appropriate remedy.3 5 Such a strong sanction, rea-
soned the court, is not warranted when less extreme measures
could be taken to ensure adherence to discovery order.3 6
Furthermore, the defense voluntarily chose to seek sanctions
against the prosecution. It was in pursuance of that end that its
defense strategy was revealed, rather than a delay in discovery be-
cause of prosecutorial misconduct.3 7 Finally, the court found that
the disclosure of the strategy was of very little consequence be-
cause liberal discovery rules make each side's strategies equally
accessible, and "trial by ambush" is no longer available as a tech-
nique to be used by either side.38
The court concluded that the trial justice exceeded his author-
ity under Rule 16 by dismissing the entire indictment against the
defendants.3 9 It was careful to note, however, that the trial justice
did not abuse his discretion; rather, he merely had an insufficient
basis upon which to enter a dismissal order.40 Thus, his discretion
was never brought into action. For a trial justice to have the au-
thority to enter such a sanction, very rare circumstances such as
those present in State v. Quintal would have to exist.4 1 The case at
bar was not considered to be one of those instances.
Supervisory Power
The court acknowledged that the superior court is vested with
an inherent supervisory power to govern proceedings before them.
This power, although not codified by statute or enumerated by con-
stitution, allows the court to impose appropriate sanctions against
any party before it if necessary to carry out the court's orders. 42
The supervisory power of the court is not to be exercised with-
out limitations. The United States Supreme Court recognizes the
34. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1273.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1273 n.2.
37. See id. at 1274.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1275.
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existence of the inherent authority, but has cautioned lower courts
as to improper exercise of that power. For example, the Supreme
Court has warned that harsh sanctions, such as reversal of convic-
tions,43  or excluding the use of evidence," to "punish"
prosecutorial misconduct are appropriate only in the more extreme
cases of misconduct.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Jack-
son4 5 is consistent with the federal ruling that a court's use of su-
pervisory power must be narrow; it does not allow for the creation
of rules not explicitly authorized, nor the dismissal of indictments
in the absence of outrageous conduct and prejudice to the defend-
ant.46 Because such sanctions are indeed harsh, they must derive
from an explicit source of law rather than the inherent supervisory
power.
CONCLUSION
Only under the most extreme circumstances may a court dis-
miss the charges of an indictment. Once a grand jury returns an
indictment, it is the court's duty to evaluate the merits of the is-
sues. Dismissing the charges to vindicate prosecutorial miscon-
duct is an act of overreaching and is far too excessive to reasonably
correlate to the wrongdoing.
Christopher H. Lordan
43. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07 (1983).
44. See Unites States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1980).
45. 570 A.2d 1115 (R.I. 1990).
46. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1276.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Francis, 719 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1998).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the Maloney
rule applies in all district court proceedings. Under the Maloney
rule, the exclusion of evidence alleged to have been obtained ille-
gally must be sought procedurally by a motion prior to the trial.
Otherwise, postponement of the suppression hearing, until during
the trial, would forfeit the State's right to seek judicial review of
the trial justice's finding since jeopardy would have attached at
that point.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
State v. Francis' involved a trial that was scheduled to be con-
ducted at the district court level.2 Defendant had made a motion
to suppress evidence which the state intended to use at trial.3
Prior to trial, the state made an oral request that defendant's mo-
tion be heard and decided by the court before the commencement of
the trial.4 This request was made before the swearing in of any
witnesses. 5
The district court justice denied the state's request for a pre-
trial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress after arguments by
both sides. 6 The trial justice did, however, grant the state's motion
to stay the trial in order to allow the state to petition the Rhode
Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.7 The supreme court
granted the state's petition.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the central
issue concerning this case was jeopardy.9 The court noted that
jeopardy attaches in district court proceedings in a similar manner
in which it attaches in superior court proceedings. 10 Jeopardy can
1. 719 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 859.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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attach in two different ways, depending on whether or not the case
is before a jury." If the case is to be heard before a jury, "jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empanelled and sworn."12 However, in a
non-jury case, "jeopardy attaches when the first witness is
sworn."
13
The Rhode Island Supreme Court tackled a similar issue in
State v. Maloney.14 In Maloney, the court held that "in all criminal
trials conducted subsequent to the filing of this opinion, efforts to
suppress evidence must be, by motions, made and heard prior to
trial."15 Unlike Francis, where the trial was to be conducted at the
district court level, Maloney involved a trial conducted at the supe-
rior court. 16 The supreme court, however, decided that the same
reasoning which applied in Maloney should apply equally in
Francis.17
The court found that the extension of the Maloney rule to dis-
trict courts was necessary to preserve the state's right to appeal a
suppression. 18 According to the court, a postponement of the sup-
pression hearing would "subvert the state's right to appeal," be-
cause, once the first witness is sworn, jeopardy attaches. 19
Therefore, if the defendant prevails in a suppression hearing held
concurrent with the trial, the state's appeal of the trial justice's
decision to suppress is irrelevant, because, even if successful upon
appeal, the defendant cannot be re-tried due to the double jeopardy
clause.
Thus, in all criminal cases held in the district court, to effectu-
ate the state's opportunity to challenge the exclusion of essential
evidence, any suppression hearings should be held prior to the
commencement of the trial. 20 Thereupon, if the defendant's motion
to suppress is granted, the state shall be afforded the opportunity
11. See id.
12. Id. (citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 (1978)).
13. Id.
14. 300 A.2d 259, 265 (R.I. 1973).
15. Francis, 719 A.2d at 859 (quoting State v. Maloney, 300 A.2d 259, 265 (R.I.
1973)).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
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to file a petition for certiorari with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, for review of the trial justice's decision.21
CONCLUSION
Under the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Francis, the common district court practice of holding suppression
hearings and trials simultaneously has been determined to violate
the state's right to appeal the suppression of essential evidence. In
Francis, the court extends it's prior holding in State v. Maloney,
which addressed superior court pre-trial criminal procedure, to the
state's district courts. As a result, in all criminal proceedings, any
suppression hearing must be heard and decided prior to the com-
mencement of the trial.
Christopher E. Friel
21. See id. at 859-60.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998).
When a trial justice declares a mistrial based on the prosecution's
negligent and unintentional failure to disclose inculpatory evi-
dence, and ten months later a second trial justice dismisses the
charge based on the same prosecutorial misconduct, the second
trial justice commits reversible error when no additional prejudice
accrued to the defendant in the ten months between trials that
could not have been cured with some lesser sanction than
dismissal.
In State v. Musumeci,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court revis-
ited the issue presented in State v. DiPrete:2 the propriety of pre-
trial dismissal as a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct under
Rule 16(i) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 In
Musumeci, the court overruled the holding in DiPrete which held
that a trial justice has "no authority" to dismiss a case as a sanc-
tion for prosecutorial misconduct. 4 Rather, the Musumeci court
held that, like all of the other sanctions specifically provided for in
Rule 16(i), imposition of dismissal is to be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, but that it is not an appropriate remedy in the absence
of flagrant misconduct and substantial prejudice. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1993, the defendant, Robert Musumeci (Musumeci), was
charged with one count of unlawful delivery of marijuana in viola-
tion of section 21-28-4.01(A)(2)(a) of the Rhode Island General
Laws, after an undercover police officer had made repeated at-
tempts to purchase drugs from him at his place of work, the North
1. 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998).
2. 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I. 1998).
3. Rule 16(i) provides:
Failure to Comply. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, it may order
such party to provide the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material which or tes-
timony of a witness whose identity or statement were not disclosed, or it
may enter such other order as it deems appropriate.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i).
4. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1274.
5. Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 63-66.
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Providence public works department (DPW).s After several
months, the defendant allegedly sold the officer one quarter ounce
of marijuana for $50.00. 7 At trial, the defendant sought to assert
the defense of entrapment, and his attorney claimed in his opening
statement that Musumeci "had never used and had never been in-
volved with illegal drugs."8
During cross examination of the police officer, it was revealed
for the first time that the officer had kept a log documenting the
operation, and that the log revealed both Musumeci's familiarity,
and prior experiences with drugs.9 Musumeci moved for a dismis-
sal of the charges, arguing that the prosecution's failure to make
the log available during pretrial discovery had materially
prejudiced his ability to obtain a fair trial. 10 The trial justice ruled
that the conduct of the state was nondeliberate, but nonetheless
found that it was a violation of Rule 16 of the Rhode Island Rules
of Criminal Procedure." The trial justice determined that dismis-
sal was too severe a sanction under these circumstances, but found
that a mistrial would be sufficient to remedy the situation.12
Ten months later, at his second trial, the defendant sought to
have the charges dismissed based on double jeopardy grounds.' 3
The second trial justice proceeded to dismiss the case on the
grounds that Musumeci was prevented from interviewing wit-
nesses while events were still fresh in their minds.14 The second
trial justice noted the nondeliberate nature of the prosecution's ac-
tions, but nonetheless determined that dismissal of the charges
was appropriate based on the deterrent function such a sanction
would serve, as well as on a finding that the defendant was de-
prived of timely interviews of witnesses. 15 The state appealed the
second trial justice's dismissal of the charges.
6. See id. at 59.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 60.
15. See id.
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BACKGROUND
Three months prior to Musumeci, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had decided State v. DiPrete, in which it was held that a trial
justice has no authority, under Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss a case pretrial for violations of
discovery by the state, in the absence of flagrant misconduct and
substantial prejudice. 16 In DiPrete, the court found that the con-
duct of the state involved only delayed discovery, and thus found
that the prejudice accruing to the defendants (defendants forced to
reveal trial strategy in their pursuit of the imposition of sanctions),
was not sufficient to justify dismissal.' 7 In DiPrete, two justices of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court recused themselves,' 8 and two
retired justices were brought back to decide the case. 19 In
Musumeci, the entire sitting supreme court, without the retired
justices, heard the appeal. 20
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The Musumeci court first addressed the propriety of dismissal
as a discovery-violation sanction. 2' The court held that because
the state's conduct was merely negligent, and because the log was
eventually turned over, dismissal of the case by the second trial
justice was an abuse of discretion.22 The court found that
Musumeci had not presented evidence of his inability to locate or
effectively interview witnesses, or that he had in fact tried to con-
tact such witnesses at all. 23 Thus, the court held that, in the ab-
sence of a showing of some additional prejudice accruing to the
defendant after the conclusion of the first trial, the second trial jus-
tice was not at liberty to dismiss the charges.24 Especially when
16. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1274 (R.I. 1998).
17. See id. at 1273.
18. See Tracy Breton et al., Rhode Island On Trial, Ch. 15: Teachings:
Through Turmoil and Tragedy, the State's Case Moves Ahead, Prov. J. Bull., Aug.
16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12200558 ("Robert Flanders had briefly served as
governor DiPrete's part-time legal counsel ... Maureen McKenna Goldberg had
been appointed to the bench by DiPrete.").
19. See Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 66.
20. Id. at 65-66.
21. Id. at 60.
22. See id. at 64.
23. See id. at 62.
24. See id. at 64.
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the first trial justice had specifically found that declaring a mis-
trial was sufficient to rectify the prejudice.25
Although this part of the holding was consistent with DiPrete,
(i.e. that dismissal is inappropriate in the absence of flagrant mis-
conduct and substantial prejudice, and that merely delayed discov-
ery is insufficient prejudice to justify dismissal), the court
overruled DiPrete to the extent that DiPrete held that a trial jus-
tice has "no authority" to dismiss a case under Rule 16 for discov-
ery violations of the prosecutor.26 Rather, the court found that,
like all of the other sanctions specifically provided for in Rule 16,
dismissal is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.27 The court
found itself less reluctant to overrule such a recently decided case
than it would be otherwise, in light of the fact that it was decided
in part by two retired justices. 28 Accordingly, the court found the
"no authority" standard enunciated in DiPrete to be so far inferior
to the widely accepted abuse of discretion standard, that the for-
mer "is so unique that it is without precedent and is likely to be
without progeny,"29 such that it would be appropriate to overrule
it.30 The court additionally found that double-jeopardy was not a
bar to the second prosecution, because the state had not goaded the
defendant into seeking a mistrial and, citing Oregon v. Kennedy,3 '
found that when a defendant requests a mistrial, it is not a bar to a
subsequent prosecution.32
Chief Justice Weisberger, author of the majority opinion in
DiPrete, issued a concurring opinion, in which he agreed that the
second trial justice's dismissal of the charges should be vacated,
but chastised the majority for overturning the "no authority" test
articulated in DiPrete.33 He reiterated his holding in DiPrete rea-
soning: that dismissal is to be reserved for only the most extreme
cases, and only when the twin predicates of flagrant prosecutorial
misconduct and substantial prejudice are found.3 4 Chief Justice
25. See id.
26. See id. at 66.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 65-66.
29. Id. at 65 n.9 (quoting Western Pacific R.R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R.R.
Co., 345 U.S. 247, 275 (1953)).
30. See id. at 64-66.
31. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
32. See Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 66-67.
33. See id. at 67.
34. See id. at 70.
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Weisberger would have found that in the absence of these prereq-
uisites, dismissal was wrong as a matter of law, and not merely an
abuse of discretion.3 5 Rather, he believed the second trial justice
had no discretion in this context which she was at liberty to
exercise.36
Justice Goldberg concurred in the holding of the court that
pretrial dismissal under Rule 16 should be reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, but dissented from the majority's holding that dis-
missal was an abuse of discretion in this case.3 7 Justice Goldberg
found that, at the very least, the case should have been remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on the question of the degree of preju-
dice accruing to Musumeci,38 and also stated that "I am of the
opinion that Rule 16 should be used not only to remedy the preju-
dice resulting from a party's nondisclosure but also as a prophylac-
tic measure to deter future misconduct."3 9 Justice Goldberg would
have held that the interest in preserving the integrity of the judi-
cial system, (i.e. deterrence of future misconduct), would counsel
dismissal in this case.40
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that Musumeci was decided only three months
after DiPrete, it has helped to clarify the state of the law regarding
pretrial dismissal. In the wake of Musumeci, it is now clear that in
order for a trial judge to be justified in entering dismissal, the con-
duct of the state must be flagrant, and the prejudice resulting to
the defendant must be so substantial that no lesser remedy will be
suited to rectify it.41 It is also clear that merely delayed discovery
will not normally rise to the level of prejudice required to justify
dismissal if there is no additional prejudice, 42 and that merely neg-
ligent misconduct on the part of the state is equally insufficient to
support dismissal.43 Additionally, despite the court's "guidelines"
as to the factual predicates that must exist prior to an entry of
35. See id. at 71.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 74 n.16.
39. Id. at 76.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 63-64.
42. See id. at 62.
43. See id. at 64.
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dismissal, the judge's actions in this regard will not be disturbed
unless they amount to an abuse of discretion." Thus, although the
abuse of discretion standard returned to in Musumeci is a signifi-
cant departure from the "no authority" test enunciated for the first
time in DiPrete, the factual circumstances that would serve to up-
hold dismissal seem to be consistent in both cases.
Michael P. Robinson
44. See id. at 66.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Pineda, 712 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1998).
When an appellant files a petition for writ of certiorari to the
supreme court, but fails to order a transcript of the lower court
proceedings, the supreme court will dismiss the petition pursuant
to Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, Article I, Rule
10(b)(1).
In State v. Pineda,' since the record on appeal lacked the req-
uisite findings and evidentiary rulings from both the district court
and Administrative Adjudication Court (AAC) judges, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court could not conduct a meaningful review of
the issues Pineda raised.2 Additionally, for collateral estoppel pur-
poses, the district court decision, taking the form of findings of fact
made during the district court's hearing on motion for judgment of
acquittal in a nonjury trial, can neither serve as a final judgment
nor have any legal effect.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 27, 1996, a Pawtucket police officer stopped an
automobile, driven by Luis Pineda (Pineda), which was operating
on a blown tire.4 Waiting for Pineda to produce his license and
registration, the officer detected the scent of alcohol; additionally,
the officer noticed Pineda's bloodshot eyes.5 The officer asked
Pineda to step out of the vehicle.6 Upon doing so, Pineda stum-
bled; and he ultimately failed the officer's field sobriety tests. 7 The
officer, upon advising Pineda of his rights, took him into custody."
En route to the police station, Pineda fell asleep. 9 Upon his arrival
at the station, Pineda had difficulty remaining awake. 10 The of-
ficer read the "Rights for Use at the Station" form to Pineda, but
Pineda was either unwilling or unable to sign it." Pineda then
agreed to submit to a chemical breath test. However, he did not
1. 712 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 862.
4. See id. at 859.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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complete the test successfully. 12 Thus, the officer charged Pineda
with refusal to submit to a chemical test in violation of section 31-
27-2.11s of the Rhode Island General Laws and driving under the
influence of liquor in violation of section 31-27-2.14
The Sixth Division District Court entered a judgment of ac-
quittal on the driving-under-the-influence charge, because the
prosecution failed to establish that it complied with section 31-27-
3.15 This section affords a person arrested and charged with oper-
ating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor with the opportunity to be examined by a physician of his or
her own choosing, at his or her own expense. 1 Additionally, the
arresting officer must immediately inform the person of this right
and afford reasonable opportunity to exercise it.17 Thus, at trial,
the prosecution must prove that the officer so informed the accused
and afforded him or her reasonable time to exercise the right.18
12. See id.
13. Section 31-27-2.1 states in pertinent part:
(b). . . the administrative adjudication court shall immediately notify the
person involved in writing, and upon his or her request, within fifteen (15)
days shall afford the person an opportunity for a hearing as early as prac-
tical upon receipt of a request in writing.... If the administrative judge
finds after the hearing that the law enforcement officer making the sworn
report had reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person had
been driving a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.., and that the person while under arrest refused to
submit to the tests upon the request of a law enforcement officer, that the
person had been informed of his or her rights in accordance with § 31-27-
3, and that the person had been informed of the penalties incurred as a
result of noncompliance with this section, the administrative judge shall
sustain the violation.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
14. See Pineda, 712 A.2d at 859.
15. See id. Section 31-27-3 states that:
A person arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of narcotic drugs or intoxicating liquor, whatever its
alcoholic content, shall have the right to be examined at his or her own
expense immediately after the person's arrest, by a physician selected by
the person, and the officer so arresting or so charging the person shall
immediately inform the person of this right and afford the person a rea-
sonable opportunity to exercise the same, and at the trial of the person the
prosecution must prove that he or she was so informed and was afforded
that opportunity.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
16. See Pineda, 712 A.2d at 859.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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The only evidence of such a finding by the district court con-
sists of an undated order entitled "Findings of Fact," which Pineda
filed with the supreme court.' 9 The AAC held a hearing on Janu-
ary 13, 1997 on the charge that Pineda refused to submit to a
chemical test.20 The prosecution again had the burden of proving
that it complied with section 31-27-3 to sustain a finding under
section 31-27-2.1.21 Thus, Pineda motioned the court for a pretrial
ruling that would collaterally estop the prosecution from relitigat-
ing the issue of compliance with section 31-27-3 because of the dis-
trict court's aforementioned "Findings of Fact." 22  The
administrative judge denied the motion, began a hearing on the
merits and eventually sustained the refusal charge. 23 Pineda ap-
pealed the prehearing ruling regarding the estoppel issue as well
as the decision on the merits to an AAC appeals panel; the panel
affirmed the administrative judge's ruling and decision. 24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Pineda produced majority, concurring and dissenting opinions.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Bourcier, wrote the majority
opinion. Justices Flanders and Lederberg wrote the concurrence,
while Chief Justice Weisberger dissented.
The Majority Opinion
In State v. Pineda, the Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed
Pineda's petition for writ of certiorari. Pineda raised three issues
in his petition:
that the evidence produced at the hearing demonstrates that
Pineda did submit to the breathalyzer tests because the
breathalyzer printouts, which read "deficient sample," are in
and of themselves insufficient to prove that Pineda did not
19. The "Findings of Fact" order stated that:
After a full trial on the merits in this case, the Court finds that the state
failed to establish its compliance with section 31-27-3 of the Rhode Island
General Laws for the purposes of this trial. For that reason the court
granted [sic] the Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal [sic].
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 860.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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submit to the test, (2) that Pineda was not fully informed of
his rights because he was asleep at the time the rights were
administered to him, and (3) that the state was collaterally
estopped from relitigating its compliance with § 31-27-3 be-
cause the issue had previously been decided in the Sixth Divi-
sion District Court.25
Although the supreme court recognized that these issues were
"matters of great import that have yet to be addressed by [the]
court," it declined to reach the questions because "the record on
appeal is devoid of the requisite findings and the evidentiary rul-
ings of both the AAC judge and the District Court judge ...."26
Thus, the court refused to rely on "inference and supposition" to
decide the questions Pineda raised.27
Rule 10(b)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure requires that the appellant, within ten days after filing his or
her notice of appeal, "shall order from the reporter a transcript of
such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant
deems necessary for inclusion in the record."28 In In re Kimberly
and James29 and State v. Jennings3 ° the court held that if an ap-
pellant fails to comply with Rule 10(b)(1), then the court may dis-
miss the appeal.31 Pineda's "record" consisted of a transcript,
which Pineda prepared, of the AAC hearing.3 2 Additionally, the
district court proceedings were not preserved via a stenographic
record.33 As such, the supreme court determined that the "Find-
ings of Fact" statement, which Pineda prepared and the district
court judge signed, was inadequate for the purposes of the
supreme court's judicial review. 34 Thus, the court lacked a tran-
script of the pretrial hearing before the AAC judge regarding
Pineda's motion to estop the state from relitigating whether it had
in fact complied with section 31-27-3.35 Due to the "glaring de-
25. Id. at 860.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P. Rule 10(b)(1).
29. 583 A.2d 877 (R.I. 1990).
30. 366 A.2d 543 (R.I. 1976).
31. See Pineda, 712 A.2d at 861 (citing In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d at 879; Jen-
nings, 366 A.2d at 545).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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fects" in the record, impeding its ability to review the hearing
judge's decision regarding the issue, the majority had no alterna-
tive but to dismiss the petition and affirm the appeals panel's
decision.3 6
Additionally, the court would not review Pineda's estoppel is-
sue. Pineda supported his argument with the "Findings of Fact"
made during the hearing on his motion for judgment of acquittal in
a nonjury trial; such findings are in fact a "legal nullity."3 7 In
State v. McKone,38 the court stated that "in jury-waived trials in
this state, the appropriate motion by which a defendant may chal-
lenge the legal sufficiency of the state's trial evidence at the close of
the state's case is by motion to dismiss."39 In fact, the court went
on to conclude that, in criminal trials, the trial justice's obligations
regarding motions to dismiss in nonjury trials versus motions for
judgment of acquittal in jury trials are wholly different in form and
effect: "[hienceforth, motions for judgment of acquittal in jury-
waived criminal trials will be considered legal nullities and be sub-
ject to summary dismissal by the trial justice."40 Thus, for collat-
eral estoppel purposes, since Pineda failed to bring the appropriate
motion, the district court's decision neither represented a final
judgment nor had legal effect.
The Concurrence
In their concurrence, Justices Flanders and Lederberg dis-
agreed with the majority regarding the collateral estoppel issue.
They agreed with Chief Justice Weisberger's dissent on that point,
except for one crucial determination: the prosecution's burden of
proving that it in fact complied with section 31-27-3. Justices
Flanders and Lederberg concluded that the General Assembly in-
tended for the prosecution to prove compliance with the statute as
an element of its case.41 Thus, the prosecution must prove such
compliance beyond a reasonable doubt.42 Since the district court
determined that the state had not proved compliance with section
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. 673 A.2d 1068 (R.I. 1996).
39. Pineda, 712 A.2d at 861 (quoting State v. McKone, 672 A.2d 1068, 1072
(R.I. 1996)).
40. Id. at 862 (quoting McKone, 672 A.2d at 1073).
41. See id. at 863 (Flanders & Lederberg, JJ., concurring).
42. See id.
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31-27-3, the district court was in fact applying a higher standard of
proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) than the civil standard (clear
and convincing evidence) used in administrative violation hear-
ings like breathalyzer-refusal cases.43 Therefore, since criminal
prosecutions for driving-under-the-influence charges utilize a
higher standard of proof, the district court's finding cannot bar the
state from attempting a future proceeding against the same de-
fendant before the AAC. 44 For, in this situation, the party has a
much heavier burden of persuasion in the initial action than he
would need to meet in the subsequent action.45
The Dissent
Chief Justice Weisberger dissented from the majority regard-
ing the applicability of collateral estoppel. Although the proceed-
ings in the AAC were civil rather than criminal, collateral estoppel
would prevent the rehearing of the same factual issue in a subse-
quent proceeding as long as the burden of proof was the same.46
Chief Justice Weisberger drew an analogy between determining
the compliance with section 31-27-3 and determining the volunta-
riness of a confession before introducing it into evidence. 47 The lat-
ter requires the state to determine voluntariness by clear and
convincing evidence. 48 Thus, Chief Justice Weisberger stated that
the burden of proof in district court proceedings for determining
compliance with section 31-27-3 is also by clear and convincing evi-
dence.49 This is the same burden of proof for all breathalyzer-re-
fusal issues in civil proceedings at the AAC. 50
Although Chief Justice Weisberger agreed with the majority's
holding that McKone bars trial judges from hearing motions for
judgment of acquittal in jury-waived cases, he nevertheless em-
phasized that "the acquittal of a defendant by a court of competent
jurisdiction, even if the procedure were erroneous, is still binding
43. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-43-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) ("[nlo
charge may be established except by clear and convincing evidence.")).
44. See id.
45. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4), at 273
(1982)).
46. See id. at 864 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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for double-jeopardy and collateral estoppel purposes."5 ' Therefore,
since the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the
driving-under-the-influence charge, and, in such cases, compliance
with section 31-27-3 is a condition precedent to introducing sub-
stantive evidence of intoxication, the District Court's finding is not
"vitiated or invalidated" merely because the court lacks a tran-
script of the trial proceedings.5 2 Significantly, Chief Justice Weis-
berger emphasized the trial judge's specific, written finding
acquitting Pineda due to a section 31-27-3 violation: "This finding
clearly sets forth the judge's factual determination even though he
reached it by a route other than that approved in McKone.. .. "53
Thus, collateral estoppel barred the AAC from redetermining that
same factual issue.
CONCLUSION
State v. Pineda, stymied by procedural flaws, left unresolved
several important issues of first impression. This case is itself a
labyrinth in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court justices can-
not come to terms with issues of burden of proof, whether an issue
is, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact and the proper function
of collateral estoppel. Hopefully soon, a case involving section 31-
27-3 will arise where the justices can resolve these important is-
sues. Until then, State v. Pineda stands for the proposition that
proper procedure is still a definitive benchmark in Rhode Island's
system of justice.
Neal R. Pandozzi
51. Id. at 865 (citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 (1978)).
52. Id. Of interest is Chief Justice Weisberger's statement that "[iin the ordi-
nary course stenographers are not utilized in the District Court, and therefore,
such a record will seldom be available." Id.
53. Id.
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1998).
An indictment or information is not fatally duplicitous where it de-
scribes the period of the alleged acts in terms of "day and dates,"
but becomes fatally duplicitous when the bill of particulars does
not adequately clear the ambiguity of the counts.
In State v. Saluter,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem concerning duplicitous indictments and infor-
mations. In Saluter, the court determined that even if an
indictment or information is duplicitous, it is not fatal unless the
state's bill of particulars does not clear the ambiguity.2 Addition-
ally, the court rejected the state's contention that the crime of sex-
ual assault consists of a continuous course of conduct, thus making
it impossible for the information or indictment to include specific
dates.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 8, 1994, Glenn A. Saluter (Saluter) was charged by
indictment with two counts of first-degree sexual assault, four
counts of first-degree child molestation, and three counts of second
degree child molestation.4 These offenses allegedly occurred be-
tween April 1, 1984 and April 30, 1987, while defendant was living
with the complaining witness' mother. 5 The complaining witness,
Amy, was under the age of thirteen during the period of the alleged
incidents. 6
Saluter moved, pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for a bill of particulars.7 The bill of
particulars provided by the state alleged that Saluter committed
the acts charged in seven of the nine counts on multiple occasions.,
Only in Counts Five and Eight did the state allege a single incident
of conduct charged in that count.9
1. 715 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 1256.
3. See id. at 1255.
4. See id. at 1251.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
that the bill of particulars was inadequate and the charges duplici-
tous, violating Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 10 Saluter also argued that the manner of the charges,
as they stand, deprived him of the minimum notice requirement
under both the Federal Constitution and Rhode Island law." The
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial justice, who concluded
that the indictment charged "nine specific acts" and afforded Sa-
luter sufficient notice. 12
After trial, a jury convicted Saluter on all nine counts.' 3 De-
fendant filed a timely appeal to the supreme court, raising two is-
sues. 14 First, whether the nature of the bill of particulars, together
with the evidence presented at trial and the justices failure to ade-
quately instruct the jury, resulted in uncertainty over whether the
jury's decision was based upon the same conduct for which the in-
dictment had been returned.' 5 Second, whether the trial justice
committed reversible error in his instructions to the jury.16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The gravamen of defendant's argument rests upon the issue of
duplicity. According to the court, "'duplicity' refers to the joining of
two or more offenses, however numerous, in a single count of an
indictment."17 The problem with duplicity stems from a defend-
ant's fundamental right to due process.' 8 At a minimum, due pro-
cess requires that "a defendant be afforded 'adequate notice of the
offense with which he is charged. '""9
All nine counts of the indictment used the same "formulaic
language" when describing the charges. In each of the counts the
defendant was charged as acting "on a day and dates" when refer-
ring to the period of his conduct. 20 The court found that it was not
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 1252.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1253.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 1252 (quoting State v. Hendershot, 415 A.2d 1047, 1048 (R.I. 1980)).
20. See id. at 1253.
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clear whether the defendant was charged with a single act or mul-
tiple acts in each of the nine counts. 21 However, the court decided,
this language alone "did not render the indictment defective per
se."
22
Such language is not per se duplicitous because a general
charge such as this can be reduced to specific facts in a bill of par-
ticulars. 23 A bill of particulars "provide[s] the defendant with the
factual detail omitted from an indictment or information. Its pri-
mary purpose is to supply the defendant with such particulars as
are necessary in order that judicial surprise is avoided at trial."24
Here, however, it was the Attorney General's failure to clarify the
ambiguity in the bill of particulars, that led the court to conclude
that the indictment was fatally duplicitous.25
To exemplify the problem with duplicity in the present case,
the court discussed one count brought against the defendant in de-
tail. In response to Count Two of the indictment, the bill of partic-
ulars read as follows:
Count 2. The State's answer with respect to dates, times, and
places is the same as Count 1. The allegations are that de-
fendant inserted his finger or fingers into the vagina of the
complainant more than once, and with a frequency of "quite a
few times per week" during the period alleged in the
indictment.26
At trial, Amy had testified regarding numerous incidents where
the defendant digitally penetrated her vagina.27 Two such inci-
dents were recounted in detail: once when she was wearing a
striped nightgown, and another time where she endured the same
abuse "in exchange for being excused from having to eat her vege-
tables at dinner."28 Both incidents took place within the time
frame charged in Count Two, and both incidents were offered at
trial as evidence of the charged crime. 29
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id. (citing State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 890 (R.I. 1997)).
25. See id. at 1256.
26. Id. at 1254.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
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The problem was further amplified because the "trial justice
appeared to suggest [to the jury] that the dinner incident was the
act charged by Count Two, whereas the state contended in its clos-
ing argument that the nightgown incident satisfied its burden of
proof for that count."3 0 According to the court, the jury could have
convicted the defendant under Count Two based upon either of the
two incidents.31 The court theorized that,
If some members of the jury were convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the nightgown incident did take place while
the remaining members were not adequately convinced of
that allegation but instead were convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the dinner quid pro quo had occurred, the
jury could have returned a verdict on count 2 without the ac-
tual jury unanimity required for conviction under our laws.32
The state claimed that the crime of sexual assault, as opposed
to other crimes, constitutes a continuing course of conduct, thus
eliminating the duplicity problem when charging these offenses.33
The court, while recognizing that some other states permit charg-
ing sex crimes as continuing offenses, refused to step into what it
perceives to be "the domain of the Legislature," by judicially creat-
ing a crime of continuing sexual assault.34
The court differentiated this case from two earlier cases in
which the duplicitous issue was raised: State v. LaPlante35 and
State v. Roberts.36 In both LaPlante and Roberts, the defendants
waived their objections to the complaints by failing to comply with
the rules of criminal procedure.3 7 The court noted that the proper
method by which to attack a duplicitous complaint, indictment, or
information, is by filing a timely motion to dismiss pursuant to Su-
perior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) and (3)38 In the
case at bar, Saluter preserved that claim by raising the issue in a
timely manner.
30. Id. at 1254-55.
31. See id. at 1255.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1255.
34. Id.
35. 409 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1979).
36. 420 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1980).
37. See Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1254.
38. See id. at 1254 (citing State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837, 840 (R.I. 1980)).
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CONCLUSION
In State v. Saluter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem of duplicitous charging in criminal com-
plaints, indictments and informations. The court held the use of
the phrase "on a day or dates" when charging various sexual as-
sault crimes was not per se duplicitous. However, the failure to
clarify such, through a bill of particulars, so that the defendant is
charged with one offense in each count, warrants a vacation of the
convictions of those counts. Additionally, the court noted that the
issue of duplicity is properly raised through a pretrial motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(2) and (3).
Christopher E. Friel
